EXTRADITION TREATIES-INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT APPROVES EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION OF
FOREIGN CRIMINALS-UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, 112 S.

CT. 2188 (1992)

I. FACTS
On April 2, 1990, bounty hunters posing as Mexican police authorities
forcibly kidnapped Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a physician of Mexican

citizenship, from his medical office in Guadalajara.'

The bounty hunters

took Dr. Machain by force to a private plane and flew him to an El Paso,
Texas airfield.2 Upon arrival in the United States, his abductors turned him
over to agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
who arrested him on charges relating to the 1985 kidnap, torture, and murder

of DEA special agent Enrique Camarena.3
After the Mexican government learned of the abduction of Dr. Machain,
the Mexican Embassy formally requested a detailed report of possible U.S.

'United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D.Cal. 1990). At about 7:45
that evening, just after he had finished treating a patient, five or six armed men burst into Dr.
Machain's office in Guadalajara. One of the men showed Dr. Machain a badge which
appeared to be a badge of the Mexican federal police, and another placed a gun to Dr.
Machain's head and told him to cooperate or be shot. Id. The men took him by car to a
house in Guadalajara, where one of the men hit Dr. Machain in the stomach after he exited
the car at his abductors request. Inside the house, Dr. Machain was forced to lie face down
on the floor for two to three hours, and Dr. Machain testified that the men used an electric
shock device to shock him several times through the soles of his shoes. Dr. Machain also
testified that he was injected twice with a substance that made him feel "light headed and
dizzy." Id.
2 Id. at 603. The United States government allegedly paid the abductors $20,000 of an
agreed sum of $50,000 and financed the relocation of a number of the abductors and their
families to the United States. Linda Greenhouse, High Court To Weigh Trial of Suspect
Abducted to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1992, §1, at 6. The district court found that the DEA
had sponsored the abduction of Dr. Machain, although it did not conclude that the DEA had
actually participated in the kidnapping itself. Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 609.
' Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 6. Special Agent Camarena was on assignment in Mexico
for the DEA at the time of his kidnapping. Dr. Machain allegedly administered drugs to
Camarena in order to prolong his life during the more than thirty hours of torture and
interrogation inflicted on Camarena by his kidnappers. 2 Court Rulings Prevent Release of
Mexican Doctor Held By U.S., N.Y. TIMES, August 25, 1990, § 1, at 9.
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involvement in the kidnapping of Dr. Machain.4 The Mexican Embassy
later demanded the return of Dr. Machain to Mexico, insisting that U.S.
officials had authorized the abductions.5 Following his indictment for his
alleged role in the murder of special agent Camarena,6 Dr. Machain moved
to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the abduction violated the
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico7 and that the court
thus lacked proper jurisdiction.' The district court granted the motion to
dismiss and ordered the repatriation of Dr. Machain to Mexico. 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
indictment against Dr. Machain.' The Ninth Circuit accepted the district

4 The request was made by means of a diplomatic letter to the United States Department
of State. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604.
' Mexican officials also submitted a third note to the State Department requesting the
provisional arrest and extradition of an informant and a DEA special agent to Mexico to face
charges relating to their roles in securing the abduction of Dr. Machain. Id.
6 Dr. Machain was indicted with five counts relating to the kidnapping and murder of
special agent Camarena and his pilot, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar. The charges included
conspiracy to commit violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity, committing violent
acts in furtherance of racketeering activity, conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent, kidnap of
a federal agent, and felony murder of a federal agent. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601.
n. 1. Dr. Machain denied the allegations and maintained his innocence of the charges. Brief
for Respondent at 2, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
s Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 605-06. Dr. Machain's motion to dismiss the indictment
was based on two theories: first, that the abduction constituted outrageous government
conduct amounting to a violation of Dr. Machain's due process rights; and second, that the
district court lacked proper jurisdiction over him because the DEA had sponsored the
abduction of Dr. Machain in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. The district court rejected the outrageous government conduct claim. Id. at 605.
The district court found that Dr. Machain's claims of repeated electric shock lacked
credibility, and in any event did not amount to torture, and thus dismissed Dr. Machain's
challenge to jurisdiction based on alleged due process violation, Id at 606.
9 Id. Dr. Machain was not repatriated but remained in custody in the United States to
await the government's appeal. Christopher Marquis and Aaron Epstein, U.S. Moves to Calm
Outraged Mexican Officials, HOUSTON CHRONIcLE, June 17, 1992, §A, at 14.
'0 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir.1991). The Ninth
Circuit relied on its decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1356-57
(9th Cir. 1991), vacated as moot, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992), and found a fortiori that the
Mexican government had unequivocally stated in diplomatic correspondence, both to the U.S.
government and to the court, that Dr. Machain's abduction violated the Extradition Treaty
between the two nations and demanded that the United States immediately return Dr.
Machain. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467.
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court findings that the U.S. government was involved in the abduction of Dr.
Machan and that the "specific formal diplomatic protests" to the abduction,
submitted by the Mexican government to United States authorities,
adequately served as official protests to the treaty violation."

The Verdugo defendant, Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, was also allegedly involved in
the drug cartel that abducted and tortured Special Agent Camarena. Mexican police officials
kidnapped Verdugo, handcuffed and blindfolded him, and stuffed him into the back seat of
an automobile. After a two-hour drive to the United States border, the Mexican police
officers forced Verdugo through a hole in the fence separating Mexico from the United States,
where U.S. marshals produced a warrant for his arrest. Henry Weinstein, U.S.-Backed
Kidnappings Ruled Illegal, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1991, §A, at 1. A federal grand jury
returned a five-count indictment against Verdugo, charging him with various offenses
including the murder of Special Agent Camarena. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1343. Following a
two-month jury trial resulting in Verdugo's conviction on all the charges against him, the
district court sentenced him to four consecutive 60-year terms of incarceration, to run
concurrently with a life sentence for murder. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
convictions, concluding that the government-sponsored abduction of a Mexican national from
Mexican soil violated the purpose of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico, even if the treaty did not expressly prohibit such abductions. The court further held
that such a treaty violation, when coupled with a formal protest by the offended nation, gave
a defendant the right to invoke the treaty violation to defeat the district court's jurisdiction.
The court then remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Verdugo's
abduction had in fact been authorized by United States authorities. Id The Supreme Court's
decision in Machain, however, rendered the decision moot and the evidentiary hearing
unnecessary. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Verdugo marked a departure from the long-standing KerFrisbiedoctrine, which evolved from two Supreme Court decisions, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The doctrine states that a court will
not inquire into the means by which jurisdiction is obtained over a criminal defendant.
GEoiFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 189 (1991).
" Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1360-61. In the trial of Dr. Machain, the district court accepted
as an official protest two formal letters submitted by the Mexican government and filed with
the U.S. State Department requesting an investigation into the abduction of Dr. Machain and
demanding his return. Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467. For text of the diplomatic correspondence
submitted by the Mexican government, see Reply Brief for Respondent at 4, United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (91-712).
Generally, an individual claiming a breach of an extradition treaty must present proof that
his sovereign is protesting the violation on his behalf. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cit. 1990), cert denied, I11 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (individuals have no
standing to challenge violations of international treaties unless the sovereign involved filed
a protest). Although it is unclear what constitutes a protest, it is generally recognized that a
defendant would have to prove that the offended nation had registered an official document
with the United States Department of State objecting to the treaty breach. Caro-Quintero,
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
remanded the case back to the district court for the Defendant's trial for the
murder of Enrique Camarena. n Held, the United States sponsored abduction of a fugitive criminal suspect from foreign soil does not prohibit his trial
in a U.S. court, notwithstanding an official protest by the offended nation.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The abduction of foreign nationals from one country for prosecution in
another is a recognized violation of general international law and custom. 3

745 F. Supp. at 608; see also Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 259. The official protest
requirement is not absolute; the doctrine of specialty serves as an illustration of a rule which
allows an individual to invoke a treaty even if his sovereign elects not to do so. United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 421 (1886) (although Rauscher's sovereign, Great Britain, did not
protest U.S. jurisdiction over him, Rauscher himself was permitted to invoke the treaty).
32 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2197
(1992).
13 See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 432 cmt. b
(1987)
(international law prohibits law enforcement officers of one nation from conducting criminal
investigations or arresting an individual in another state without the consent of that state); see
also RESTATEMENT § 432 cmt. c (1987) (international law requires that the state sponsoring
the abduction of an individual must return him upon demand by the offended nation).
The territorial integrity of sovereign nations is recognized by such international agreements
as the United Nations Charter art. 2, para. 4, and the Charter of the Organization of American
States art. 20. Although these agreements do not explicitly prohibit official abductions from
other countries, they do illustrate the customary standards within which the United States and
Mexico negotiated the extradition treaty.
Additionally, courts outside the United States have recognized that the extraterritorial
abduction of criminal suspects violates the sovereignty of independent nations. For example,
in R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, Ex Parte Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. 24 (Great Britain 1981),
the British Lord Chief Justice prohibited the prosecution of a British subject deported from
Zimbabwe to the United Kingdom. British police officials had conducted covert maneuvers
to effect his arrest in an attempt to evade the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act of
1881, which regulated extradition between members of the British Commonwealth. Although
British courts follow the rule that physical presence of a defendant bestows jurisdiction,
official evasion of statutory extradition procedures bars prosecution. Thus, because the
officials failed to follow the 1881 Act, jurisdiction over the suspect was invalid. See also In
re Jolis, [1933-34] Ann. Dig. 191 (Tribunal Correctionnel d'Avesnes) (arrest of Belgian
national by French police in Belgium held to be a "nullity" because the Belgian government
lodged an official protest with the French Government); the Casablanca case, (France v.
Germany), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 110 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916) (French military authorities
improperly seized German deserters from the French Foreign Legion who had sought German
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However, United States courts have not always honored this principle,
instead adhering to the Ker-Frisbierule, under which a court may decline to
question the means by which a defendant has come before it.' 4 Despite this
historical aversion to questioning the means of rendition, some courts have
increasingly noted that an illegal abduction might divest a court of jurisdiction over a defendant if the abduction violates an existing extradition treaty,
and if the nation from which the defendant was abducted lodges a formal
protest. 5 Notwithstanding this trend, grounded in important developments
in due process, other courts largely continue to comply with the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine.
A. Treaty Interpretation
In determining the propriety of measures used to obtain criminal fugitives
for trial, the interpretation of extradition treaties is vital: treaty interpretation
provides the court with an insight into the expectations of the contracting
states regarding their rights and obligations in matters of international
criminal law. 6 No recognized legal obligation exists among nations to
extradite individuals sought by other nations." 7 The practice of governments acting in conjunction with one another to effect the transfer of

Consulate protection in Casablanca); the Schnaebele case, described in III Travers, Le Droit
Penal Internationale 151-54 (Paris 1924) (French police official lured into Germany and then
arrested by German police officials promising safe transport, returned by German government
after official French protest). But cf. Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cour de Cassation 1964)
(repatriation not required if offended state fails to submit official protest before trial).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cit. 1975) (forcible return
to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court constitutes no bar to prosecution once the defendant is
within the United States).
15United States v. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1355 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Matta-Ballesteros
v. Henman, 896 F.2d at 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring an official protest by offended nation
before it would consider defendant's claim that abduction violated international law); United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp 909, 916 (D.D.C. 1988) (defendant precluded from raising his
objection to seizure because neither Lebanon nor Cyprus filed formal protests to the
circumstances of arrest).
16 See GILBERT, supra note 10, at
17.
17

M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE

10 (1987). Originally, nations entered into extradition treaties with the self-preservation of
their leadership in mind. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442 (1886) (extradition
treaties viewed as a "restriction upon the right of the government of the country of the asylum
to protect the criminal from removal therefrom").
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extraterritorial defendants occurs as a result of intergovernmental goodwill.'" Treaties, on the other hand, confer the right on a signatory nation
to request certain conduct of another in certain situations, in exchange for the
obligation to do the same when requested. 9 The United States itself has
negotiated numerous extradition treaties with other nations in order to
establish procedures by which contracting parties may conduct the effective
transfer of criminal fugitives.'
When a court faces a matter involving an extradition treaty, it must
determine whether the treaty is of a self-executing or an executory nature. 2'
"s In the absence of an extradition treaty, there is no general obligation of nations to
surrender individuals sought for trial in other nations, although the transfer may take place
as a matter of comity among nations. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412
(1886); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (a nation may, if its constitution
and laws permit, voluntarily surrender a fugitive to the country seeking him); Stevenson v.
United States, 381 F.2d 142, 143-44 (9th Cir. 1967) (voluntary surrender of fugitive by
Mexico); United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1006-09 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
'9 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 412; see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. at 287
(international law principles recognize that the legal right to request extradition and the duty
to surrender exist only when created by treaty); Allen v. United States, 713 F.2d 105, 108 (5th
Cir. 1983) (same).
20
The United States has extradition treaties currently in effect with the following nations:
Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvala, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
Zambia. The Republic of Korea has a prisoner transfer treaty with the United States, though
the two nations do not have an extradition treaty. Additionally, several nations have
concluded judicial assistance treaties of limited scope with the United States. UNIED STATES
DEPERTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1991). None of these agreements contain
language excluding government abduction of criminal suspects.
21 The distinction serves an important function. Self-executing treaties have the force of
law and are enforceable without legislation to implement them. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp.
599, 606 (C.D.Cal. 1990). United States courts have long recognized the right of individuals
to enforce rights set forth in self-executing treaties. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102 (1933) (invoking treaty with Great Britain permitting seizure of vessels smuggling liquor
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After this determination, the court will next interpret the terms to determine
the treaty's meaning and legal effect.22 In doing so, it is necessary to
assess whether the terms provide signatory nations with an exhaustive list of
methods for obtaining valid jurisdiction over a defendant, or whether nations
may employ means not specified in the treaty. 23 If the treaty provides an
exhaustive list of the available means of securing jurisdiction, practices
outside the scope of the provision would violate the treaty as well as the
defendant's due process rights, thus divesting a U.S. court of jurisdiction
over him.2
B. Ker and Frisbie: Approval of Government-SanctionedAbductions

Analyzing a rendition conducted outside the scope of an extradition treaty,
during the Prohibition era; for discussion see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text); Clark
v. Allen, 33 U.S. 503 (1947) (inheritance rights under treaty with Germany); Bacardi Corp.
of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (trademark rights under multilateral treaty);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199 (1796) (right to collect private debts under treaty with
Great Britain).
Additionally, a self-executing treaty purports to create obligations which are enforceable
without implementing legislation, see Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606; see also Trans
World Airlines Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (no domestic legislation
necessary to give self-executing treaty the force of law in the United States), and are intended
to benefit the individual asserting a legal interest under them. See Head Money Cases (Edye
v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). Self-executing treaties must be enforced in a federal
court unless superseded by federal law. Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 606.
Executory treaties, on the other hand, are legally enforceable only upon the enactment of
legislation giving them full effect. Id. Without implementing legislation, executory treaty
matters become "the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the
injured party chooses to seek redress." Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 606 (citing Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99).
2 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (analysis of "the text of the treaty
and the context in which the words are used" crucial to treaty interpretation).
23See GILBERT, supra note 10, at 8. For example, Dr. Alvarez argued that the extradition
treaty limited the United States to two alternatives: requesting the defendant's extradition or
relying on Mexican authorities to prosecute him. The Supreme Court found that the list of
alternatives was not exhaustive and did not preclude abduction. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2194-95 (1992).
' United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1350 (9th Cir. 1991). For example,
the Verdugo court held that the options available to the United States were limited to
submitting a formal extradition request to Mexico or to requesting Mexican acquiescence to
an abduction sponsored by U.S. authorities. The United States had done neither, and thus the
Ninth Circuit held that proper jurisdiction to hear the case was not present. Id at 1350.
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the Supreme Court, in Ker v. Illinois,25 established the rule that the
unauthorized forcible abduction of an individual from a foreign nation does
not violate the individual's right to due process of law and thus does not
deprive a court of jurisdiction over a defendant so seized. 26 In Ker, the
Court held the means by which the government obtained jurisdiction over a
criminal defendant is immaterial, so long as the defendant faces the court on
a valid charge.27 In support of its holding, the Court found that the
abduction, performed by a private individual employed by the United States
but unauthorized to conduct a kidnapping, had taken place outside the
2
parameters of the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru. 8
Further, because a signatory nation had not invoked the treaty, the defendant
had no access to the rights conferred by the treaty.'
The notion that Ker sanctions the government-sponsored abduction of
fugitives received further support from the Supreme Court's approval of the
25 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
26

Id. at 440. Ker was an American citizen living in Lima, Peru and wanted by authorities

in Illinois for larceny and embezzlement. The governor of Illinois petitioned for a warrant
of extradition from the Department of State. In response, the Secretary of State issued a
warrant and dispatched a Pinkerton agent to Peru with the necessary papers to request Ker's
extradition in compliance with the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru.
Failing to follow the extradition process, the messenger abducted Ker and transported him by
sea via Honolulu to San Francisco and eventually to Illinois where he stood trial and was
convicted. Id. at 437-38. Ker argued on appeal to the United States Supreme Court that his
abduction in Peru violated his guarantee of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the agent had not brought him before the Court by means of the extradition treaty.
The Court concluded that the trial proceedings had satisfied Ker's due process rights. Id. at
438-39.
27 Id. at 443-44. At the time of Ker's abduction a Chilean-backed revolution was taking
place in Peru, which not only caused the court system to cease functioning but also forced
the Peruvian government to seek refuge in a mountain village eighty-five miles away. The
Court may have justified the Ker holding on the special circumstances surrounding the
situation, although the majority did not state this in the opinion. John G. Kester, Some Myths
of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. .J. 1441, 1445 (1988).
28 In concluding that the abduction took place outside the bounds of the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru, the Court stated:
Ker's abductor did not act or profess to act under the treaty. In fact, that
treaty was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made
the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case of
kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of
authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States.
Ker, 119 U.S. at 442-43.
9 Id. at 438.
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interstate kidnapping of a fugitive in Frisbie v. Collins.3" The Frisbie
Court found Ker applicable to wholly domestic situations and restated its
position that forcible abduction does not violate an individual's guarantee to
due process of law.3
Subsequent to the Supreme Courts' decision in Ker, the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine has become a well-established principle of law. The proposition
resulting from this doctrine asserts that a United States court need not divest
itself of jurisdiction over a defendant solely because the defendant's presence
was obtained through extralegal means. Some courts have taken the doctrine
a step further, interpreting it as precluding any inquiry into the means of
securing jurisdiction over criminal defendants.3 2 Following the United
States' lead, other nations have also used the rule to justify improper means
of gaining the presence of defendants.3"

30 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Frisbiehad no connection'with issues of international extradition
law; it concerned the government supported abduction of an individual in Illinois who was
fleeing prosecution in Michigan. The defendant, Shirley Collins, was in Illinois when he was
abducted by Michigan law enforcement officers and returned to Michigan to face murder
charges. Id. at 520. The Supreme court rejected Collins' contentions that he should be
released because the forcible manner in which he was arrested violated his guarantee of due
process, stating that "the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact
that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."'
Id. at 522.
' Id. The Frisbie court overturned the Sixth Circuit's holding in favor of Collins, which
found that his arrest took place under circumstances which constituted an impermissible
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. See Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 468 (6th
Cir. 1951).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991) (no inquiry into
forcible abduction from Colombia); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984)
(alleged abduction of defendant from Honduras insufficient to divest district court of
jurisdiction); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (forcible abduction of
defendant from Panama irrelevant); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974)
(abuction from Peru and failure to follow extradition process insufficient to destroy
jurisdiction); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (1st Cir. 1957) (alleged abduction from
Mexico held irrelevant).
" Probably the most notorious case in which a foreign state has invoked the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine is Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L.REP. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), afd,
36 INT'L L.REP. 277 (S. Ct. Isr. 1962). Israeli agents kidnapped Eichmann from Argentina
to stand trial in Israel for his role in Nazi atrocities which took place in Poland during World
War II. Conducted without the knowledge or participation of the Argentine government, the
abduction was a clear violation of Argentina's sovereignty. The Argentine government
dropped its protest over the violation of its sovereignty upon the approval of the trial by the
United Nations Security Council Resolution on 24th June 1960. 15 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess.,
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C. Toscanino and Rauscher: Limitations on the Ker-FrisbieRule.
Notwithstanding the long-standing adherence to the Ker-Frisbie rule, a
federal court may in certain instances lack jurisdiction to try a criminal
defendant seized by means of forcible abduction.3 In United States v.
Toscanino,31 the Second Circuit limited the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine in light of
the "due process revolution" which expanded the concept of constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights.'
The Second Circuit held that the Due

Supp. for Jan.-Dec. 1960, U.N. Doc S/4349. In the resolution, the Security Council
condemned the Israeli conduct as an encroachment on Argentina's sovereignty and a threat
to world peace, and requested Israel "to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and rules of international law." 15 U.N. SCOR 15th Sess.,
868th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. S/PV.868 (1960). Eichman argued at trial that the court lacked
jurisdiction to try him because the abduction violated Argentina's sovereignty. The court
relied on Ker and other Anglo-American precedent in ruling that the means of acquiring a
defendant is irrelevant to the trial. See GnIwRT, supra note 10; see also Michael H. Cardozo,
When ExtraditionFails is Abduction the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961).
3' United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Toscanino, an Italian national
living in Uruguay, alleged that Uruguayan officials, sponsored by U.S. authorities, abducted
him from his home in Uruguay and handed him over at the Brazilian border to Brazilian
authorities also paid by the United States. Id at 269. Toscanino further alleged that his
abductors held him for seventeen days in Brazil, and that during this period they severely and
repeatedly tortured and interrogated him in the presence of a member of the U. S. Department
of Justice Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs before drugging him and bringing him
to the United States to face federal conspiracy charges related to narcotics trafficking. Id. at
269-70.
After it had established that U.S. involvement in such activities would constitute a violation
of an individual's right to due process, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ordered a hearing to determine the extent of the United States' involvement in the case. Id
at 281. At this hearing, Toscanino failed to provide credible evidence of either the presence
of U.S. officials at his abduction or U.S. involvement in his alleged mistreatment at the hands
of the Uruguayan or Brazilian authorities. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
35 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 The term "due process revolution" refers to the Court's emphasis on Constitutional
rights which was marked by such landmark decisions as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963) (evidence obtained as the result of police behavior which violates the Fourth
Amendment may not be used as evidence at trial), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending the exclusionary rule in holding that evidence illegally obtained by state officers
was inadmissible at a state criminal trial of the victim of the unlawful search). Jonathan
Gentin, Comment, Government-Sponsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals Abroad:
Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1238 (1991); see also Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275 (due
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Process Clause applies in cases of outrageous government conduct and
divests a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in much the same
way illegal governmental conduct might cause certain evidence to be
excluded." Despite its liberal interpretation of the Due Process Clause in
Toscanino, however, the Second Circuit has declined to follow this rationale
outside Toscanino's factual context.38 Other courts have given a more
expansive reading to Toscanino, preferring not to apply the exclusionary rule,
even at the risk of infringing upon individual rights. 39
On the same day it decided Ker, the Supreme Court handed down its

process reqiires a court to divest itself of personal jurisdiction over a defendant "where it has
been acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights").
3"Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The Toscanino court attempted to balance Ker with the
doctrine of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), to develop a due process argument
based on outrageous physical treatment. In Rochin, an officer who had seen the defendant
swallow what appeared to be drug capsules arrested him and directed a doctor to force a tube
into the defendant's stomach. The doctor administered a solution to induce vomiting, which
produced two morphine capsules used ultimately to convict the defendant. The court found
the government conduct to "shock the conscience" and to "offend those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of English-speaking peoples," and held that due
process barred the government from deliberately acting lawlessly in bringing the accused to
trial. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
' See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d. Cir 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (limiting Toscanino to situations where offended state formally
protests the invasion of sovereignty and where government conduct is "appropriately
condemned as most inhuman"); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Toscanino inapplicable absent showing of mistreatment at hands of U.S. government
representative); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (conduct involved
was not "gross mistreatment" but resembled circumstances of ordinary arrest).
" The Supreme Court has held that the societal need to bring criminals to justice
substantially outweighs the desire to correct an error made by law enforcement officers.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976) (maintaining that the question of guilt or
innocence "is the central concern in a criminal proceeding" and precludes application of the
exclusionary rule in a jurisdictional context); accord United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508
(11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (Toscanino inapplicable where appellant
failed to prove claims of kidnapping and extended torture during abduction from Peru and
delivery to federal authorities in Miami); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1974) (defendant failed to allege the sort of "cruel, inhuman, and outrageous treatment
allegedly suffered by Toscanino").
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decision in United States v. Rauscher.40 In Rauscher, the Court held that
the internationally accepted doctrine of specialty, which provides that an
individual may face trial only for the crime for which he was extradited, was
an implied part of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain even
though the doctrine was not specifically included in the text.4 ' Because the
United States had violated the treaty by employing an improper means of
acquiring jurisdiction over Rauscher, the Court concluded that no United
States court could exercise jurisdiction over him "until a reasonable time and
opportunity have been given him... to return to the country from whose
asylum he had been forcibly taken . .,.2 Thus, the Court concluded that
under certain circumstances, it is well within a court's duties to inquire into
the means by which a defendant is brought before it.
The Court continued to place importance on treaty obligations, including
implied obligations, in Cook v. United States,43 where the Court held that
by signing a treaty, a nation restricts its own authority in certain instances."
In Cook, the Court held that a treaty violation defeated the jurisdiction of

40119 U.S. 407 (1886). Rauscher was second mate on an American vessel named the J.F.
Chapman. While the ship was at sea, Rauscher allegedly murdered a crew member named
Janssen. Rauscher fled to England, and U.S. officials sought his extradition on the murder
charge. Upon request from the State Department, the British government surrendered him.
Id. at 409.
Rauscher went to trial in federal district court in New York charged not with murder, but
with infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. The infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment was not one of the extraditable offenses enumerated in the 1842 WebsterAshburton Treaty. Id at 408-09. The defendant was charged, tried, and convicted in federal
district court under charges of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.
41Id. at 423.
42 Id. at 430.
43288 U.S. 102 (1933).
4 Id. at 121. The defendant, a British subject, was assessed a fine after United States
authorities seized his vessel for allegedly violating laws banning the importation of alcoholic
beverages during the Prohibition era. However, the vessel was seized outside the permissible
zone defined in a treaty permitting U.S. authorities to board, search, and seize British vessels
suspected of smuggling liquor. The treaty required that the vessels to be searched be within
the distance from the customary three-miles-from-shore limit "which could be traveled in one
hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense." Id. at 110 (citations
omitted). The vessel in question, the Mazel Toy, could not be operated at a speed of more
than ten miles per hour. United States authorities boarded, searched, and seized the vessel
and its cargo off the Massachusetts coast, 11 1/2 miles from the edge of the three-mile limit.
Id.
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United States court. 45 Thus, the Court determined that by signing a treaty
with Great Britain, the United States had accepted certain limitations on its
own authority in exchange for concessions from Great Britain. 4
The treaties invoked in Rauscher and Cook regulated the means by which
a defendant could come under the jurisdiction of a United States court.
Together the decisions support the basic principle that courts are not forced
to accept jurisdiction over individuals brought to justice in violation of treaty
obligations. Although these cases are many years old, they remain grounded
in strong logic and continue to guide courts addressing issues relating to
treaty violations.47
D. Verdugo:
Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit Clarifies the Role of the Ker-Frisbie

Applying its understanding of both the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and extradition law, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, adopted
an approach to the issue of illegal abductions which clarifies the relevance
of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to treaty violations.48 The Ninth Circuit first

45Id. at 121. The Court reasoned that "[t]he Treaty fixes the conditions by which a vessel
may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or possessions for
adjudication" under United States laws. Id.
' The Court found that "the government itself lacked power to seize, since by the treaty
it imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority" in exchange for the right to board,
search and seize private vessels of British registry outside U.S. territorial waters. Id.
47See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267,278 (2d Cir. 1974) (following Cook
in concluding that courts have a duty to ensure that international agreements are faithfully
kept and observed); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979) (reading Cook
as representing the proposition that self-executing treaties may be invoked to deprive U.S.
courts of jurisdiction over individuals otherwise subject to jurisdiction); Fiocconi v. Attorney
General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the judicial
remedy fashioned in Rauscher to a situation where extradition obtained was as an act of
comity rather than treaty obligation).
4' 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated as moor, 1212 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). Like Dr.
Machain, Verdugo faced prosecution in the United States for his alleged involvement in the
abduction and murder of DEA Special Agent Camarena, and Verdugo likewise challenged the
court's jurisdiction over him on the grounds that he was forcibly abducted from Mexico and
brought to the United States to stand trial. Verdugo's kidnappers abducted him in Mexico
and then cuffed his hands, blindfolded him, and stuffed him in the back seat of an automobile.
The abductors drove Verdugo to the U.S. border, and then pushed him through a hole in the
border fence to awaiting U.S. marshals who took him into custody. Henry Weinstein, U.S.
Backed Kidnapings Ruled Illegal, L.A. TIMEs, July 23, 1991, § A, at 1.
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rejected the U.S. government's argument that Ker-Frisbie controlled
Verdugo, which involved a government-sponsored abduction from a nation
which officially protested the intrusion onto its soil.49 After concluding that
extradition treaties provide a comprehensive method of regulating the
rendition of an extraterritorial fugitive under its jurisdiction, the court stated
that jurisdiction achieved by extralegal means was a redressable violation of
law.' The Court further asserted that U.S. involvement in extraterritorial
In rejecting the notion that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine completely precluded any inquiry into
the means of a defendant's rendition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the governmentsponsored abduction of a Mexican national without Mexico's consent constituted a violation
of the extradition treaty. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1358. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit asserted
that if the offended nation formally protested a treaty violation, the individual challenging the
court's jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding could invoke the treaty terms.
9 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1346. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first stated that Ker
involved kidnapping by a private citizen wholly unauthorized by any United States official
and asserted that "Ker stands only for the proposition that a private kidnapping does not
violate an extradition treaty. It does not address the question of a kidnapping authorized by
the United States government." Id.
The court then noted that Ker was not dispositive of the case because in Ker the Peruvian
government had not protested the extradition treaty violation. Noting that Ker involved a case
of kidnapping neither authorized by the U.S. government nor challenged by the "offended"
Peruvian government, the court emphasized the presence of a formal objection in the Verdugo
case, stating that "numerous cases have suggested that were the government of the country
from which an individual was kidnapped to lodge a formal protest with the United States, that
protest might defeat jurisdiction." Id The court suggested that the revolution occurring in
Peru at the time of Ker's abduction may have made an official protest improbable. See supra
note 28.
Finally, relying upon Rauscher to reject the broad reading of Ker-Frisbie and its progeny,
the Court of Appeals determined that "it is manifestly untrue that a court may never inquire
into how a criminal defendant came before it." Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1348. The court
extended the reasoning behind the Rauscher specialty argument to extradition treaty disputes,
applying the principle that "violation of a treaty under appropriate circumstances prevents a
court from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant." Id.
Additionally, the court rejected the application of Frisbie on two grounds: first, that Frisbie
centered around a claimed violation of due process, whereas Verdugo's claim was grounded
in the treaty violation; and second, that Frisbie properly involves interstate rendition, whereas
the international kidnapping of defendants requires an entirely different analysis. I&.at 1347.
0lit at 1351. The Verdugo Court presented two arguments to support its finding that
extradition treaties proscribe government-sponsored kidnappings. The court first looked to
the underlying purpose of extradition treaties, determining that "[niations enter into extradition
treaties in order to impose... legal obligations on one another under appropriate conditions
...to secure the benefits of international cooperation." Id. at 1349. The court further
rejected the government's contention that extradition treaties are of consequence only when
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abduction in violation of an extradition treaty conferred upon the individual
standing to challenge the court's jurisdiction over him, if the nation from
which the abduction occurred were to file a formal protest.51 The Court
then found that if the United States had violated the Extradition Treaty by
participating in Verdugo's abduction, U.S. jurisdiction over him would be
invalid.52

formally invoked, stating that this view "blatantly contravenes the purposes underlying
extradition treaties." Id. at 1350. The court examined the rule of specialty and found it to be
embodied in all extradition treaties, either expressly or implicitly, and thus signatory nations
are precluded from extraditing individuals for prosecution on charges other than those
enumerated in the treaty. The court then stated that, a fortiori, an individual abducted by a
treaty signatory nation could challenge a court's jurisdiction over him absent the consent of
the nation from which he was taken. Id
Second, the court drew upon general principles of international law to support its finding
that extraterritorial abductions were precluded where extradition treaties existed. Id. at 135152. The court referred to such documents as Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, supra note 14, as well as the United Nations Charter, supra note 13, of
which both the United States and Mexico are signatories, as representing the position that the
territorial integrity of a sovereign nation may not be breached by force.
The court noted that party nations to an extradition treaty were not bound to comply with
the provisions of the treaty, as long as the requested nation voluntarily acquiesced to relaxing
the procedure, either by waiver, citing United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980)
(no treaty violation where Thai authorities surrendered defendant to U.S. authorities in
Thailand), or by consent. citing, inter alia, United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261
(5th Cir. 1988) (appellant lacked standing absent protest by Belize or Guatemala of
appellant's arrest and removal), United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981)
(absent protest by Bahamian government or demand for defendant's return, existence of
extradition treaty between United States and Bahamas is irrelevant). Noting the official
protests by the Mexican government, however, the Court found no evidence of official
acquiescence in the present case. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1352.
51The court supported its approval of individual standing by presenting two arguments.
First, the court drew again on Rauscher and found that at least in situations involving
breaches of the specialty doctrine, the individual could raise whatever objection the rendering
nation might have raised. The court further stated that were Verdugo challenging jurisdiction
using a specialty defense, he would have standing. Second, the court recognized that standing
was more compelling in a kidnapping case because the United States had deliberately
circumvented the terms and purpose of the treaty. Id. at 1355-56.
The court found the existence of an official protest extremely relevant, noting that "in no
reported case has a court held that an officially authorized or sponsored kidnapping did not
violate an extradition treaty when the country from which the defendant was kidnapped
objected to the abduction." Id. at 1346.
52 hd at 1350-51. The court then remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the United States had authorized or sponsored Verdugo's abduction. Id at 1362.
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo was significant in holding that
government-sponsored abductions would not pass muster if conducted
outside the parameters of existing extradition treaties and without the consent
of the other nation involved. The holding marked a departure from the
customary lack of inquiry into the often questionable means of securing
jurisdiction over individuals.
Ill. ANALYsIs
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,3 the Supreme Court ruled that the
United States may authorize the forcible abduction of a criminal defendant
from foreign soil without violating the extradition treaty existing between it
and the nation from which the defendant was abducted.'
The decision
effectively expanded the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to include abductions
sponsored by the United States even where the offended nation filed a formal
protest. The decision also foreclosed judicial resolution to the dispute
between the United States and Mexico which had arisen over the abduction
by stating that the Executive Branch was the proper avenue through which
the Mexican government could seek redress of its claimed breach of
5
sovereignty. '
In reaching the conclusion that the defendant's forcible abduction from
Mexican soil did not destroy the district court's jurisdiction over him, the
Court relied upon three determinations. The Court first determined that
when a signatory acts without invoking an extradition treaty, and if the treaty
does not prohibit abduction, there is no treaty violation.'
Second, the
Court found no basis in international law to support an interpretation of the
Treaty at issue as implying a prohibition of extraterritorial abductions.
Third, the Court held the Ker-Frisbie rule to be wholly applicable where
there was no violation of the Extradition Treaty between the United States
58
and Mexico.

s 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
4 id. at 2197.
"'Id. at 2196.
Id. at 2191-93.
5' Id. at 2194-96.
- Id. at 2192-93.
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A. Interpreting the Treaty
The Court began its analysis by addressing whether the abduction of the
defendant violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Mexico. Examining the Treaty to determine its express provisions, the Court
rejected the defendant's arguments that the Treaty was violated. The Court
next looked to the rights and obligations implied under the Extradition Treaty
and found no basis for concluding that the United States had the duty to
refrain from authorizing extraterritorial abductions.
1. Express Obligations Under the Treaty
Initially, the Court looked to the terms of the Treaty59 to determine its
meaning and found neither an explicit obligation on either nation to refrain
from conducting forcible abductions from the soil of the other nation, nor
any stated consequences under the Treaty should either party conduct such
an abduction.'
The Court reasoned that because "nations are under no
obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for
prosecution" where there is no extradition treaty, nations which have
extradition agreements also face no such obligation to deliver until another
party invokes the treaty. 1 In reaching this premise, the Court ignored the
very reason nations enter into extradition treaties-to create reciprocal
arrangements by which nations may turn over fugitives fleeing justice.6 2
The procedures set forth in extradition treaties can be effective only if the
signatories understand them as reciprocal obligations to comply with those
procedures whenever either party seeks a fugitive located in the other state.

Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty states:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own
nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not
prevented by the laws of the Party, have the power to deliver them up if,
in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the
offense.
Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art.9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
6 Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193, citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
6' Id. at 2194.
6' See United States v. Verdugo, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Having found no express prohibition of abduction in the Treaty, the Court
concluded that the language of Article 963 failed to foreclose supplemental
methods of securing the custody of fugitives, including abduction." The
Court reasoned that in the absence of an extradition treaty, nations have
methods by which they may nevertheless secure the presence of fugitives in
flight, and that these methods include abduction.6 5 Here, however, an
extradition treaty was in effect between the United States and Mexico, and
it did create legal obligations on both parties, including the obligation to
refrain from acting beyond the scope of the agreement.'
Dissenting strongly from the majority opinion, Justice Stevens argued that

63 See

Extradition Treaty, supra note 59.
112 S.Ct. at 2194. The Court stated that Article 9 "does not purport to
specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of the national of another
country for the purposes of prosecution." Id
In addition to its position that Article 9 did not restrict the means of securing jurisdiction,
the Court reasoned that "the history of negotiation and practice under the Treaty" did not
support Dr. Machain's claim that his abduction violated the Extradition Treaty. The Court
stated that Mexico had long been aware of the United States' view that the Ker doctrine
governed forcible abductions if the Treaty was not invoked. Id. The court referred to the
1905 Martinez Incident, in which the United States applied the Ker holding to a situation in
which a defendant was abducted from Mexico to stand trial in the United States. In
diplomatic correspondence, Mexico was informed that its recourse consisted of extraditing the
abductor to face trial in Mexico. Id. at 2194, n. 11.
Contrary to the Court's interpretation, however, the Martinez Incident fails to support the
Court's interpretation because there is no evidence that Government agents were involved in
the Martinez abduction, and thus the rule in Ker was applicable there. Furthermore, the
Martinez Incident occurred long before the current treaty came into force in 1980, and the
Mexican government may have relied on the language of the existing Treaty as a guarantee
that the United States would operate within the terms of the Treaty in securing the presence
of future criminal suspects. Id.
6Machain,

65

id.

Court avoided this argument by first stating that Article 9 established procedures
for the parties to follow only when a nation invokes the Treaty, and not necessarily at other
times, and then finding that because the United States elected not to employ the Extradition
Treaty, there was no obligation to abide by the provisions therein. Id. The Court's
interpretation was contrary to the position advanced by the Mexican government, which
submitted, in an amicus curiae brief to the Court, that Mexico intended for the Treaty to
apply to all fugitive transfers, unless the parties agreed to waive the Treaty terms. Mexico
offered to the Court its interpretation that the Extradition Treaty "governs comprehensively
the delivery of all persons for trial in the requesting state for an offense committed outside
the territory of the requesting Party." Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae at
6, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (citation omitted).
6The
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the majority's reading of Article 9 as merely a noncompulsory illustration of
jurisdictioning methods reduced the bulk of the Treaty's provisions "to little
more than verbiage," mainly referring to procedural requirements for
ensuring effective and legal transfers of prisoners.67 In addition, the
Machain ruling has thoroughly undermined the fundamental purpose of the
Treaty by unilaterally altering the terms of which it agreed with Mexico."
2. Implied Obligations Pursuantto the Treaty
After the Court rejected Dr. Machain's argument that the Treaty expressly
prohibited the abduction of foreign nationals, it addressed whether the Treaty
implied a prohibition on securing jurisdiction beyond the scope of the
Treaty.' Dr. Machain argued that customary international law "so clearly
prohibited international abductions that there was no reason to state it in the
Treaty." 70 The Court rejected his contention, refusing to infer that the
Treaty prohibited all means of gaining jurisdiction which were not agreed

Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198. Provisions rendered meaningless by such a decision,
according to Justice Stevens, include: Article 3 (requiring "sufficient" evidence to grant
extradition); Article 5 (withholding extradition for political or military offenses); Article 6
(withholding extradition when the person sought has already been tried); Article 7
(withholding extradition when the statute of limitations for the crime has elapsed); and Article
8 (granting the requested State discretion to refuse an individual facing the death penalty in
the requesting country).
Responding to the majority's conclusion that extraterritorial abductions are permissible
unless expressly prohibited, Justice Stevens noted that the Treaty also fails to explicitly
prohibit execution or torture as a more expedient means of administering justice than
extradition; however, if the majority is correct, Justice Stevens suggests that such conduct
would not violate the Treaty. Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens
concedes in his dissenting opinion that the dispatching of execution squads is a "highly
improbable interpretation of a consensual agreement," it is a possible one given the court's
reasoning. See id.
68Basic rules of treaty interpretation forbid this type of unilateral interpretation. See, e.g.,
New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898) (precluding United States from
interpreting treaty with Indian tribes without informing the tribes).
67

69Id.

at 2195, citing Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 17 (1936)

(stating that "the question is not whether there had been a uniform practical construction

denying the power, but whether the power had been so clearly recognized that the grant
should be implied").
70 Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2195. The respondent argued that the Charters of the United
Nations and the Organization of American States provided further evidence of the
"international censure of international abductions." Id.
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upon by both signatories and set forth in the Treaty.7
However, Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing that the "manifest scope and
object of the Treaty itself ...plainly imply a mutual undertaking to respect
the territorial integrity of the other contracting party."72 As Justice Stevens
suggests, by promulgating a treaty to promote international cooperation,
contracting nations imply that each is willing to honor the sovereignty of the
other, at least with respect to the subject matter of the treaty. A contrary
finding minimizes the role of diplomacy and ignores the purpose of making
international agreements. Although the Extradition Treaty grants to the
requested party the option of denying the extradition request, the Treaty
implies an obligation on each party that individuals sought will stand trial for
their alleged offenses.73 The refusal of the Supreme Court to recognize this
implied obligation to follow the agreed extradition procedures nullifies the
effect of an extradition treaty by sanctioning activity outside its parameters.74

The Court stated that "[tlhe general principles cited by the respondent [including the
United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States, see supra
note 13] simply fail to persuade us that we should imply in the United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty a term prohibiting international abductions." Id. at 2196.
n Id. at 2199 (quoting United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 422 (1886).
'3 If the nation from which the extradition is being sought chooses not to grant the
extradition, "the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution." Extradition Treaty, supra note 7, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
' Dr. Machan conceded that nations may voluntarily deliver individuals for prosecution
in other nations without invoking an extradition treaty but could not convince the Court that
in the case of an abduction not approved by the offended nation, a formal protest would
require the return of the kidnapped fugitive. Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2195. The Court stated
that "the Extradition Treaty only prohibits the defendant's presence by means other than set
forth in the treaty when the nation from which the defendant was abducted objects... seems
inconsistent with the remainder of respondent's argument. The Extradition Treaty has the
force of law, and if as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, .. . a court must enforce it on
behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the
other nation." Id.
The Court noted that general international law supported this argument of Dr. Machain, but
concluded that the specific area of extradition treaties failed to support his theory. Id. at
2196. The Court stated that Dr. Machain "would imply terms in the Extradition Treaty from
the practice of nations with regards to international law more generally" than to extradition
treaties themselves and attempted to argue that the abduction was in violation of the general
international law principle that one government may not "exercise its police power in the
territory of another state." Id. The Court rejected these assertions by suggesting that a
military invasion of Mexico by the United States would be an exercise of police power which
71
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B. Applying the Ker-FrisbieRule
After concluding that no express or implied provision in the Treaty
prohibited the government-sponsored abduction of the defendant from
Mexico, the Court applied the Ker-Frisbie rule and determined that the
defendant could not successfully use his illegal abduction to challenge U.S.
jurisdiction over him."5 Because Ker involved a defendant brought before
the court by way of an illegal abduction, the Court found the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine to be controlling.76 As a result, the Court dismissed as immaterial
any evidence of the respondent's forcible abduction in determining whether
a court may exercise jurisdiction over him.77
Notwithstanding the presence of an illegal abduction in both Ker and the
present case, the Ker-Frisbie rule is simply inapplicable to the situation
presented here. Criticizing what he characterized as a "monstrous"
decision,78 Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court's "critical flaw"-the
failure to distinguish between government-sponsored abductions and action
by private citizens, removed this situation from those addressed by KerFrisbie.79 The Court failed to address the issue of government sponsorship
of illegal activity except to dismiss it as a superfluous element of the

might violate international law but not the Extradition Treaty. Id.
The military invasion illustration fails to support the Court's rationale. The respondent
never contended that international warfare had any relation to the Extradition Treaty; he
argued that the United States engineered his abduction in order to gain his presence in a U.S.
Court while skirting the provisions of the Extradition Treaty. The argument that the United
States is engaged in a "war on drugs" and that the treaty does not apply seems unpersuasive.
" Id. The Supreme Court distinguished Rauscheron the grounds that the defendant there
had come before the court by the operation of an extradition treaty and that the Rauscher
holding should be limited to similar facts. Id. at 2192-93.
76The Court declared that it "has never departed from the rule announced in Ker that the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction"' (citation omitted).
Id.
" Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2193.
73 Id. at 2206.
' In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the actions of private citizens
cannot be held to violate any treaty obligation, but conduct which is expressly authorized by
the Executive Branch of the government, such as the DEA authorization of the defendant's
abduction, "constitutes a flagrant violation of international law," as well as "a breach of our
treaty obligations." Id.

456
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defendant's argument.80 By dismissing the issue of government involvement in Machain's abduction, the Court ignored the precedent of Cook v.
United States, where Justice Brandeis distinguished government-sponsored
seizures from those conducted by private citizens and held that governmentsanctioned seizures were subject to a challenge of jurisdiction."1
Much like the government action in Cook, the United States, in authorizing the abduction of Dr. Machain, acted in a manner that exceeded the scope
of its powers, because the terms and purpose of the Treaty imposed a limit
on its permissible conduct. The Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Mexico clearly listed the limitations on the rights of the contracting
nations to use self-help in securing the presence of fugitives in court, and the
United States overstepped those limits. Remarkably, the Court, rather than
censure the U.S. activities conducted in violation of both the Extradition
Treaty and international goodwill, authorized the use of force in the land of
an ally, and in truth placed no prohibition on future encroachments into
foreign territory.
C. Redress Available to the Mexican Government
After concluding that the United States could authorize such abductions
at the expense of Mexican sovereignty, the Court suggested possible avenues
of recourse available to the Mexican government. Recognizing that the
Mexican government had protested the kidnapping of the defendant through
diplomatic correspondence to the State Department, the Court stated that the
decision to repatriate the defendant, as a matter apart from the Treaty, was
' Id. at 2193. The Court reasoned that "Ker was decided on the premise that there was
no governmental involvement in the abduction ....
Respondent finds these differences to
be dispositive" (citations and footnote omitted). The Court then addressed the legality of
abductions as a whole, without differentiating between sanctioned abductions and those
undertaken by private citizens. Id.
si Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). In Cook, another instance of illegal
government seizure in violation of another nation's sovereignty, the United States lacked the
power to seize a ship suspected of importing alcoholic beverages, during Prohibition, into the
United States.
The treaty z issue in Cook prohibited the exercise of boarding rights onto a vessel at a
distance from shore greater than the vessel could travel in one hour, and the seized vessel
could not exceed a speed of more than ten miles per hour. The government lacked the power
to seize the vessel, because it had exceeded the territorial limit imposed on it by the treaty
with Great Britain. See Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2203, n.28; for further discussion of the limits
of U.S. power in Cook, see supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
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a matter not for the judiciary, but for the executive branch. 2 Although
President Bush issued a statement promising that his administration would
not again authorize the abduction of individuals from Mexican soil, this
assurance has little practical effect. For example, such a promise is effective
only so long as the U.S. government chooses to follow it. Additionally,
there is no legal obligation imposed on future administrations to honor this
type of statement. And finally, this promise not to abduct applies only to
executive branch conduct and does not guard against state agencies operating
under other authority. 3 In foreclosing a judicial resolution to the dispute,
however, the Court failed to notice that Rauscher recognized the validity
of
s4
branch.
executive
the
as
well
as
judiciary
the
of
means
by
recourse
In holding that the United States is under no obligation to conduct itself
within the parameters of its extradition treaties, the Machain ruling presents
a potentially serious situation, in which a foreign nation might likewise
circumvent its own extradition treaty and abduct an American citizen for trial
overseas.8 5 For example, the government of Iraq, seeking American
citizens, including President Bush, to face trial in retaliation for what it
might allege to be war crimes relating to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, might
choose to abduct those it felt were responsible for the deaths of its citizenry.
Although such a situation might never occur, this scenario is plausible, and
it is quite unlikely that the United States would permit such an invasion on

82Id.

at 2196. Although the Bush Administration apologized for the invasion of Mexico's

sovereignty and promised that it will not kidnap another suspect for trial in the United States,
it refused to amend the language of the Treaty to proscribe such abductions. Damian Fraser,
Mexico and U.S. Settle Kidnapping Dispute, FIN. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at 4. Instead, the two
nations agreed to exchange diplomatic notes that will make extraterritorial kidnapping by
private citizens an extraditable offense. This move would reinterpret the Treaty to shield those
who abduct suspects under the auspices of government approval. The Administration further
refused demands made by the Mexican government for the repatriation of Dr. Machain. Id.
83 Id.
84 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1886). The Rauscher court
discounted the argument that parties seeking to challenge alleged violations of Treaty
obligations may "only appeal to the executive branches of the treaty governments for redress"
by noting that the Supreme Court may issue writs or error and habeas corpus. Id. at 431.
s5 Ruth Wedgwood, A DangerousPrecedent,NAT. L.J., July 6, 1992, at 15 (warning that
the Machain decision may encourage a foreign country to circumvent an extradition treaty and
kidnap an American executive from American soil to face a foreign trial).
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American soil or an Iraqi attempt to hide behind the Machain precedent.6
In the wake of the decision issued in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
nations seeking to guard against the possibility of illegal abductions by U.S.
invasions of their territorial sovereignty may be well advised to amend their
extradition treaties with the United States to prescribe the apprehension of
individuals outside the parameters of an extradition treaty. To preserve its
own territorial integrity against possible United States intrusions as the one
which occurred in Machain, a nation might negotiate an amendment to its
extradition treaty divesting jurisdiction over defendants seized by methods
which violate international law.87
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decision in Alvarez-Machain expanded the Ker rule
to uphold jurisdiction over individuals who are abducted from other nations
to stand trial in the United States, regardless of whether the offended nation
lodges a formal protest and demands the repatriation of the individual.
Although the Ker decision has long been recognized as based on the absence
of a sovereign protest and the lack of government participation in the
abduction, the Machain court expanded the doctrine to include those
abductions which occur under official United States sponsorship, even if the
offended nation files a formal protest. The Supreme Court thus broadened an
already controversial doctrine to sanction illegal kidnappings abroad by
government operatives. Without some sort of limit placed on the actions of
law enforcement agencies, this decision may signal a weakening in
international cooperation in bringing fugitives to trial.
Because the paramount goal is rightly to pursue justice whenever a crime
has occurred, the use of abductions and other extralegal methods to obtain
jurisdiction over fugitives will continue. This pursuit of justice, however,

In fact, the United States showed signs of just such a hypocritical position as early as
1948. In response to an attempt by the Soviet Union to abduct a Soviet citizen fron U.S. soil,
the State Department declared that the United States Government "cannot permit the exercise
within the United States of the police power of any foreign government." 19 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 251 (1948); see also the Eichmann incident, supra note 34.
97 Of course, countries are free to effect the delivery of criminal suspects informally, so
long as both nations agree to circumvent the treaty. For discussion of consent to irregular
rendition and waiver of the procedures established in extradition treaties, see supra note 50.
See also Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. at 439,
442 (Supp. 1935).
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does not take place in a vacuum, and therefore nations should undertake
irregular methods of rendition only when no other alternative exists, and only
then with a keen eye to respecting both individual rights and international
sovereignty.
Michael R. Wing

